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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: A COMMENT 
ON THE INAPPROPRIATE USES 
OF AN OLD ANALOGY 
William W. Van Alstyne* 
I. 
"The petitioner," Holmes declared, "may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.111 Three quarters of a century later, however, the Su-
preme Court made a different observation: 
To the extent that the [opinion below] may be read to suggest that 
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First 
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment 
on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the 
public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has 
been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.2 
The "numerous prior decisions" to which the Court referred, and 
others to which it might also have referred in rejecting the consti-
tutional orphanage of public employees, all appeared during the 
three decades of Supreme Court service by Mr. Justice Douglas. 
No one has done more than he to secure the equal protection 
of public employees under the Bill of Rights. Never impressed 
by the suggestion that the state is somehow not so much the 
state when it is also an employer, he has steadfastly denied that 
those whose livelihood is linked with government must accept their 
labor as a mere privilege which the state may ration without con-
stitutional review. Rather, many of Justice Douglas' rugged contri-
butions to the con.stitutional rights of public employees reflect a 
single, essential proposition: The state is always the state and 
therefore always constrained by the Constitution irrespective of the 
capacity in which it acts. 
What government is forbidden to do directly it may not do by 
indirection; what is not justified when sanctioned by fine or jail is 
no more justified when sanctioned instead by a threat to the source 
* Professor of Law, Duke University. 
1 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). 
2 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
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of one's livelihood. As the first amendment will protect an employee 
from the threat of jail for writing letters in support of a given can-
didate or for serving as a poll watcher, so should it also protect him 
from the loss of his nonsupervisory public job.3 If a citizen cannot 
be subjected to a fine without a fair hearing, neither may he be 
threatened with an equally important loss such as discharge from 
his public employment without a hearing.4 The immunities of the 
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment are straightforward 
and unqualified, and no reason has ever existed to give them a 
cramped construction. The fourteenth amendment provides unequiv-
ocally that "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law"; it leaves no quarter for a 
different, more grudging view that "this amendment shall not apply 
when the state acts in a proprietary, rather than in a governmental 
capacity."5 The first amendment is firm and universal in its man-
date that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
of speech"; it yields no insinuation that "this amendment does not 
apply to congressionally authorized standards for federal employ-
ment." 
In the private sector, an employer may, of course, be unpoliced 
by the Bill of Rights and-for lack of the requisite state action-
an employee correspondingly circumscribed in his freedom accord-
ing to the terms of the contract permitted, though not required, 
by the State.6 Even here, however, the State cannot insinuate it-
self into the transaction and trammel the employee's freedoms for 
purposes of its own which are forbidden by the Constitution.7 And 
B United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 115, 122 (1947) (Douglas, J ., 
dissenting) . · 
4 Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 899 (1961) (dissenting 
opinion). 
5 See the observation of Chief Justice Stone in Graves v. New York ex rel. 
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939): "As [the federal] government derives its authority 
wholly from powers delegated to it by the Constitution, its every action within its 
constitutional power is governmental action .... " See also the remarks by Mr. 
Justice Douglas in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 674, 678 (1967) (con-
curring opinion) : "It is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might 
terminate a lease at his pleasure. For this is government we are dealing with, and 
the actions of government are circumscribed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
6 But see Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 302 (1956) (dissenting 
opinion) : "Employers can, of course, hire whom they choose, arranging for an all-
Democratic labor force if they desire. But the courts may not be implicated in such 
a discriminatory scheme. Once the courts put their imprimatur on such a contract, 
government, speaking through the judicial branch, acts. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249." 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369 (1967); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, 
360 U.S. 474 (1959); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Cf. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 
175 (1915); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903). 
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the fact that a private employer may enforce a given condition 
without constitutional restraint yields nothing about employment 
prerogatives in the public sector, since. it is the lazy analogy be-
tween the two sectors which is condemned by the express consti-
tutional distinction between private and governmental action. Ex-
actly because it is the state (if only the state) which is foreclosed 
from negotiating terms permitted to private employers, nothing in-
structive of governmental power can ever be received by false an-
alogical reasoning from what is permitted in the private sector. 
That a private school does not want and cannot be compelled by 
force of the fourteenth amendment alone to permit its teaching 
staff to ventilate evolutionary theory obviously says nothing about 
permissible public school standards.8 That a zealous private land-
lord may restrict his choice of janitors and tenants to politically 
like-minded persons merely underscores the difference, not the sim-
ilarity, in constitutional models.9 So far as government may insin-
uate its authority and largesse, it remains uniformly constrained.10 
In half a nutshell,11 it is this gradual and overdue return to 
fundamentals which characterizes much of Mr. Justice Douglas' 
8 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Cj. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 
105, 109-12, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927). ("In dealing with its own employees en-
gaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by the limitations of . . . the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.") 
9 Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967). 
10 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 404 ( 1963): "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion 
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a 
benefit or privilege." 
11 A look into the other half of the nutshell would spy some reservations. For 
instance, Mr. Justice Douglas tacitly concurred in the opinion for the Court in 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1968), in which Mr. Justice Fortas 
acknowledged some interests the government holds qua employer-interests sufficient 
to uphold some demands which it might not make of persons with whom it lacked an 
employment relationship: "It is argued that although a lawyer could not constitu-
tionally be confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting 
his means of livelihood, the same principle should not protect a policeman. Unlike tl!e 
lawyer, he is directly, immediately, and entirely responsible to the city or State 
which is his employer. He owes his entire loyalty to it. He has no other 'client' or 
principal. He is a trustee of the public interest, bearing the burden of great and total 
responsibility to his public employer. Unlike the lawyer who is directly responsible 
to his client, the policeman is either responsible to the State or to no one. 
"We agree tl!at these factors differentiate the situations." 
Similarly, Douglas tacitly concurred in Mr. Justice Marshall's qualification of 
his remark in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), that the first 
amendment equally protects public school teachers: "At the same time it cannot be 
gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regula-
tion of the speech of the citizenry in general." 
That tl!e employment relationship may sustain some regulations which would be 
unconstitutional in the absence of such a relationship, moreover, is developed in Part 
III, infra. 
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significant contributions to the rights of public employees. Refer-
ence to the virtuoso collection of cases appearing in two articles 
by Hans Linde, commemorating the Justice's twenty-fifth year on 
the Supreme Court, will attest to the strength of his position.12 The 
last five years have largely added confirming opinions plus increas-
ing support from the rest of the Court on important holdings in 
public employment cases.13 The professional literature so thoroughly 
abounds with additional writing equally effective in demolishing 
earlier excuses for state misconduct (e.g., employment as a "priv-
ilege," the state is exempt when acting as a "proprietor," the indi-
vidual "agreed" to the terms or "waived" his rights) that the point 
is now plain: 14 the state is the state, bound by uniform constitu-
tional constraints regardless of the capacity in which it purports to 
act. 
12 See Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional 
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 4 (1964), 40 WAsH. L. REv. 10 (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as Linde]. 
13 The principal public employment and closely related public sector cases 
decided since Professor Linde's articles appeared are these: Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563 (1968); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Becker v. Philco Corp., 389 
U.S. 979, 984 (1968) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 
(1967); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 
U.S. 670, 674 (1967) (concurring opinion); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589 (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U:S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 
493 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. II6 (1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 
(1966); Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1966). 
In addition, several lower federal court decisions and several high state court 
decisions are of such obvious importance as to merit explicit reference: Meehan v. 
Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Turner v. Kennedy, 332 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 
51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Parrish 
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 C.2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967); 
Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 401 (1966); Fort v. Civil Service Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 
Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964); Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605, 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). 
14 See, e.g., O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings 
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 
( 1964). A large collection of other references is provided in the footnotes to Linde's 
article, supra note 12, and in the California Supreme Court's heavily annotated opinion 
in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966), as well as in footnote 1 of an able student Comment, Another 
Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144, 144 (1968). See also 
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 
81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Comment, The First Amendment and Public Em-
ployees-An Emerging Constitutional Right To Be a Policeman?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. 
REv. 409 (1968); Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, SUFFOLK L. 
REV. 380 (1969). 
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II. 
The emphatic rejection of the analogical model (that what is 
constitutionally permitted in the private sector is therefore permit-
ted to government when it acts in a "private" way, e.g., as entre-
preneur, proprietor, or employer), however, merely clears the air 
of canards. By itself, it yields very few positive answers as to what 
the state is forbidden to do, even granting that the state is always 
the state. Rather, it returns the constitutional inquiry to dead cen-
ter. Thus, while the mere fact that a private employer's freedom 
to hire his nephews in preference to others is not enough to show 
that a public employer may do the same thing, neither is it enough 
to show that the public employer may not do the same thing. Simi-
larly, the fact that the Constitution does not forbid a private em-
ployer from terminating an employee without a hearing does not in 
itself yield any inference that a public employer must provide a 
hearing to its employees. Rejection of the analogical model merely 
denies any constitutional correspondence between the private and 
public sectors; it yields no negative inference that whatever is 
permitted to private employers is thereby forbidden to the public 
employer. Rather, problems in the public sector are returned to 
the vagaries of substantive due process and equal protection clauses, 
more at sea than before for loss of an old, inept, but once-felt 
useful analogy. 
Without some analogical model enabling courts to move from 
a more settled area of constitutional interpretation toward coher-
ence in a less settled area where the problems appear to be "sim-
ilar," moreover, we may seem to suffer from an uneasiness or appar-
ent lack of consistency (or failure of neutral principles, if you will) 
in the decisional process. The failure of the one analogical model 
consequently leads one to yearn to find another. There is, after all, 
a feeling that public employment cases are "harder" than or "dif-
ferent" from conventional state regulation cases, needing something 
to be supplied as a reliable model for guidelines. For instance, what 
shall be said of a case where the public employee is subject to man-
datory discharge in the event he.is convicted of an act of civil dis-
turbance? Or another, conditioning employment of state employed 
accountants on abstinence from smoking (so hazardous to one's 
health)? Or a third, requiring an oath to support and defend the 
Constitution as a prerequisite to eligibility to work for a municipal 
sanitation department? Self-evident answers may not readily occur 
unless . . . well, unless one can say that these cases are really 
the "same" as (or analogous in all significant respects to) others 
where we think that we already know the answer. Or, even though 
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we do not positively know the answer under the analogical model, 
at least we think we know how to determine what it most probably 
would be and can borrow a corresponding confidence in settling the 
matter at hand. 
It is precisely here that Professor Linde believes that an anal-
ogy can be found-an analogy, moreover, which surprisingly again 
makes use of government and the private sector, albeit in a wholly 
different way. As I understand his thesis (presumably synthe-
sized from Mr. Justice Douglas' opinions), it is essentially this: 
The constitutionality vel non of a condition restricting public em-
ployment (or any other important governmental connection, e.g., 
welfare, housing, or education) is the same as the constitutionality 
vel non of the same restraint imposed by government on equivalent 
employment in the private sector. If a given governmentally im-
posed regulation of equivalent jobs in the private sector will sur-
vive all constitutional objections of the private employees whom 
it regulates, it will also survive such objections when it appears 
merely as a condition of public employment instead. If it would 
not survive constitutional objection when proposed as a govern-
ment regulation in the private sector, however, neither is it valid 
as a condition in the public sector. In short, the allegedly proper 
question to raise, in testing a requirement or condition of public 
employment for constitutionality, is this: 
The question is whether the guarantees of liberty remain the same 
when the welfare state provides public benefits and services as they 
are when government seeks to regulate private conduct by law.l6 
The analogical model does not, as noted above, merely purport 
to trade one problem for another of equal perplexity. Rather, if it 
works (and that is what we mean to examine hereafter), it allow-
ably will yield a clearer perception of the problem, cut away ob-
fuscations, and provide a context where an answer is more readily 
forthcoming. This is, of course, a claim-but the proof of the claim 
may allegedly be seen in any one of the several excellent illustra-
tions Professor Linde provides. One of these is taken from Hamil- . 
ton v. Regents of University of California,16 in which the Court 
originally upheld the exclusion of students otherwise eligible for 
admission to the University of California who refused on grounds 
of religious scruple to enroll in the compulsory ROTC program. 
At the time Hamilton was decided, the Court disregarded its then 
recent decisions on the subject of unconstitutional conditions.17 
15 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WAsH. L. REv. at 26. 
16 293 u.s. 245 (1934). 
17 See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Cornrn'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 
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Instead, it emphasized that attendance at the university was volun-
tary rather than compulsory, it characterized matriculation as a 
"privilege" rather than as a right, and it concluded that the condition 
of attendance was valid against a religious freedom claim since, 
while students had a right to be free of state-coerced activity con-
trary to abiding religious convictions, they had no right to a state-
subsidized education.18 Subsequently, in Board of Education v. 
Barnette,19 Hamilton was distinguished on the basis that in Barnette 
the children reserving religious objections to a compulsory flag salute 
were subject to treatment as delinquents if they were not attending 
school where, of course, they had to participate in the flag salute as a 
condition of remaining. The net effect of the flag-salute requirement 
was not merely to confront the students with the hard enough choice 
of respecting their religious commitment and forfeiting free educa-
tion, or of taking the education while yielding their convictions. 
Rather, they had either to attend school and salute the flag or risk 
being prosecuted as delinquents (and have their parents criminally 
prosecuted for contributing to the delinquency of a minor). Thus, 
Hamilton was distinguished and not overruled.20 
Under Professor Linde's view, however, the problem in Hamil-
ton should be examined this way: 
As far as the First Amendment is concerned, California's power 
must be tested by whether it could require military training of stu-
dents at all colleges, private as well as public.21 
And, in Barnette, the correct approach is this: 
When West Virginia undertook to compel the flag salute at public 
schools, it must be prepared to defend its constitutional power to 
require the same at private schools, though it might not in fact do so. 
When the constitutional question is thus posed, some apparently 
difficult answers become almost self-evident. New York or Pennsyl-
vania have broad authority over the curriculum that will satisfy the 
standards of a compulsory school attendance law, but would anyone 
argue that these standards could have included a requirement of the 
"Regents' Prayer" or daily Bible readings for all schools, private 
as well as public, without falling afoul of the establishment clause?22 
(1926); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Oppenheim, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions and State Powers, 26 MicH. L. REV. 176 (1927). · 
18 More recently, however, the Court has "explained" Hamilton as having held 
merely that the religious free exercise claim lacked merit. Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969). 
19 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
20 ld. at 631-32. Additionally, as subsequently emphasized in Tinker, the Court 
implied that congressional authority to raise armies by requiring compulsory officer 
training might override an objection based solely on the free exercise clause. Id. 
21 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WASH. L. REv. at 26. 
22 Id. at 26-27. 
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This way of looking at the case does indeed make the case appear 
more resolvable by placing it in a more manageable context. We 
are freed at the very outset from being misled into a wrong result 
by conceding any significance to the adventitious manner in which 
the governmental power is being exercised, i.e., we will not make 
the mistake of thinking that the government is any less the govern-
ment (and any less bound by the first amendment) when it oper-
ates as an employer or proprietor rather than as a legislator, the 
better to see its "true" position. 
Another illustration, also Professor Linde's, may convince the 
few remaining doubters of the practical value of this analogical 
model. A much vexed question still with us concerns the extent to 
which a state may restrict the use of publicly held property from 
popular assembly. In Hague v. C/0,23 the Court broadly implied 
that a few kinds of public property, e.g., parks, street corners, or 
other places customarily used as forums or locations for pam-
phleteering, could not be withdrawn from such use. Impliedly, 
however, governmentally owned property having no similar tradi-
tion of public-forum use could be completely precluded from such 
uses as long as the ban was total and therefore neutral in the sense 
that no one is favored at all, and therefore no one is more favored 
than anyone else.24 Mr. Justice Black's view, on the other hand 
(happily not the prevailing view), is that government ownership 
is sufficient per se to sustain a total ban on the use of any govern-
mentally owned property as a place for activity unconnected with 
its described use, whether or not that activity is disruptive, and 
that a constitutional question arises only where the restriction is 
incomplete (in which case the equal protection clause may come 
into play).25 
23 307 u.s. 496 (1939). 
24 Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503 (1969); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966}; Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536 (1965}; Wolin v. Port of New York Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967}, aff'd, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968}; In 
re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 383, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967); University Comm. 
v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1968}, juris. noted, 393 U.S. 819 (1968). See 
also Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEo. 
WAsH. L. REV. 487 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment 
Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: 
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1. 
25 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
515-26 (1969) (dissenting); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (dictum); 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 162, 166 (1966) (dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 559, 577, 578 (1965) (concurring and dissenting); H. BLAcK, A CoNSTITU-
TIONAL FAITH 58-63 (1968}; Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, CBS-TV Interview, 
Dec. 3, 1968, reprinted in 27 CoNG. Q. 6 (1969). 
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Using Professor Linde's analogical model, however, we come 
to a conclusion quite opposed to Mr. Justice Black's and much 
more generous than the Court's position in Hague. Under this view 
it appears that the majority in Hague as well as Mr. Justice Black 
were too beguiled by the irrelevancy of "government-as-owner," 
and that a correct perception of the issue would make clear that a 
broader field of first amendment protection exists: 
The proper constitutional test of reasons for restricting his speech 
(or an ensuing parade) there [i.e., on the grounds of the veterans' 
hospital] is whether the same reasons would or would not sustain, 
over first amendment objections, the same government restriction of 
speeches or parades at private hospitals. . . . [S]hould the principle 
not be the same for all government real estate, for parks and beaches, 
for public housing projects and college campuses, though the limits 
derived from their distinctive characteristics, functions, and nec-
essary conditions of use might differ?26 
Thus, restrictions on places to speak must be justifiable in terms 
of their necessity to protect other legitimate uses associated with 
those places, and nothing whatever turns upon the source of owner-
ship or customary use. If a decent concern for patient care would 
warrant a state law forbidding noisy speeches within the curtilage 
of a private hospital, it would sustain the same law as applied to the 
curtilage of a public hospital. Public ownership in the latter case is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient basis for the statute. Similarly, a 
statute forbidding peaceful assembly on privately owned lots is no 
stronger when limited, instead, to a ban on peaceful assembly on 
publicly owned lots whether or not such lots were traditional forums. 
It should be recognized, of course, that Professor Linde has 
fashioned a model with much more in mind than a limited equal 
protection claim in respect of statutory differentiations between the 
public and private sector. The more limited claim would merely 
observe that where the evil alleged to rationalize the need for a 
statute can readily be seen to be no more nor less an evil in the pri-
vate sector than in the public sector itself, a regulation forbidding 
a given activity only in the public sector seems arbitrary-under-
inclusive without reason.27 For instance, if abstention from know-
ing and active membership in the Communist Party is required of 
26 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WAsH. L. REv. at 42-43. See also id. at 37: "Are 
the constitutional limits less stringent when government denies the right to speak on 
public property than on private?"; the implication clearly being that they are not. 
27 See generally Tussman & Tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). For an application of this view, invalidating a regulation 
applicable only to publicly-assisted housing, see O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. 
Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 
839 (1962), reviewed critically in 8 HoWARD L.J. 158 (1962). 
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a state hospital physician based on some notion that the nature 
of his work carries intolerable risks for dangerous action, it must 
equally require the same abstention from membership by a private 
physician employed in similar tasks in a private hospital. Thus, 
the public physician may be able to claim that in being subjected 
to a restriction on his political association not imposed on all 
others similarly situated in terms of the menace to be avoided, he 
has been subjected to an invidious classification and denied equal 
protection. Again, loyalty oaths for public, and not for private, 
school teachers may be vulnerable to this sort of claim. The fact 
that the Hatch Act forbids civil service supervisory personnel to so-
licit contributions from their subordinates while it does not equally 
affect supervisory personnel in private business may seem arbitrary 
if, indeed, the legitimate purpose of the Act is merely to reduce 
opportunities for unfair or intimidating political pressure; the evil 
and likelihood of such pressure are equally present in both cases. 
There are, in short, myriad situations in which the fact that a 
given restriction applies by law only to persons in the public sector, 
but not in the private sector, may be constitutionally significant in 
determining whether public employees have been denied equal pro-
tection. While sometimes helpful (perhaps to a greater extent than 
thus far appreciated by the courts), however, this is both a differ-
ent and a significantly lesser point than Professor Linde has made. 
It is a lesser point, of course, because the equal protection claim 
will frequently fail for lack of merit even when appropriately ac-
knowledged. Conventionally, legislation is allowed to proceed by 
degrees, experimentally resolving a felt problem by steps; it is not 
a hard and fast rule that government must legislate against all of 
a problem in order to legislate against any part of it.28 Frequently, 
too, the public component of a given employment subject to regu-
lation constitutes a very large majority of the whole area of that 
employment, so that the underinclusiveness of the law is marginal; 
the regulation in the public sector appears substantially to respond 
to the problem which called it up. (E.g., a regulation applicable 
only to public secondary school teachers reaches most secondary 
school teachers, although a federal statute affecting only state uni-
versity professors may reach barely more than half of all univer-
sity professors.) The omission of private-sector counterparts of 
28 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949): "It is no requirement of equal protec-
tion that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Compare O'Meara 
v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961), 
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962) with Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 
P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962); Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 
181 A.2d 481 (1962). 
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regulated public employees may also be rationalized against an 
equal protection claim in terms of some other characteristic asso-
ciated with the fact of public employment and not equally present 
in the private sector, e.g., the administrative ease or other lower 
cost of securing compliance, and the lack of equivalent economic 
constraints on government. Thus, the apparent underinclusive char-
acter of a regulation limited only to public employees may some-
times survive an equal protection objection on the basis that the 
classification is, in point of fact, reasonably connected with a legit-
imate distinction. 
None of this is to say that the courts ought not take a harder 
look at regulations limited only to public employees for equal pro-
tection shortcomings. Surely they should do so. And in doing so, 
they might well remember that the state is the state, to avoid miss-
ing the equal protection claim once again by rationalizing the 
classification by exempting the government from constitutionally 
imposed limitations when the government acts as employer, owner, 
etc. Linde's thesis is an important one, then, even in the setting 
of an equal protection claim alone, as it serves to strip away the 
claim that there is something so uniformly or absolutely distinct 
about public employment per se that such classification is always 
and necessarily a reasonable one. A revisionist view, profiting from 
Linde's observations, might more nearly hold that such a basis of 
classification is presumptively· unreasonable, shifting to the state 
the burden affirmatively to justify placing greater restrictions on 
public employees than on their private-sector counterparts.29 But 
the basic thesis is both stronger than and different from this one. 
29 Such a presumption already obtains in a variety of areas. See, e.g., Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See also Karst & Horowitz, 
Reitman v. Mulkey: The Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT. 
REV. 39. Convenience of administration may not, moreover, be sufficient to overcome 
the presumption of unconstitutionality of certain disfavored classifications. Carrington 
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1963). Where a 
regulation reaches only employees in the public sector (or only" a portion of such 
employees) without reaching their more numerous private counterparts, greater judi-
cial activism and rigor in the application of the equal protection clause may be war-
ranted than where the regulation binds a larger political class more substantially repre-
sented in the legislative process. The point was especially well made by Mr. Justice 
Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 
(1949): "The framers of the constitution knew, and we should not forget today, 
that there is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable 
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose 
upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to 
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a 
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution 
that might be visited if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better 
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in opera-
tion." 
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It posits that no degree of added reasonableness attaches to a reg-
ulation from the role of government as employer, and it frames a 
new standard of substantive due process rather than a standard 
of equal protection. Whatever would deny substantive due process 
as a governmental restriction on private employment denies sub-
stantive due process as a condition or regulation of equivalent 
public employment. Applying this test to our hypothetical cases 
tends, moreover, to make some regulations more probably uncon-
stitutional than we might otherwise have thought. It appears doubt-
ful, for instance, that a state law requiring the dismissal of any 
private employee convicted of any civil disturbance would be up-
held, and even more doubtful that protection of ·the public from 
the felt hazards of cigarette smoking would sustain a general stat-
ute requiring the dismissal of private employees who smoke. Is 
the case any different though the rule in question immediately ap-
plies only to public employees? The implied answer is: "No." 
The analogical model may also seem to breathe new life into 
the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punish-
ment in this connection. Policing the public health by mandating 
dismissal of private employees who choose to blacken their lungs 
surely strikes one as an eccentric way of exercising the police 
power, and no less eccentric even if the regulation is rationalized as 
a way of conserving manpower resources. It seems no less so, if 
the analogy fits, when imposed as a condition on public employ-
ment.80 
I 
III. 
There are, however, serious problems which need to be over-
come before the analogical model Professor Linde proposes can 
be generalized and safely applied. Without some degree of clarifica-
so The point is a limited one and not intended to carry beyond the observation 
that where a regulation of employment threatens dismissal as a punishment for conduct 
thought to be merely bad and undesirable in general, but not relevant to one's job 
competence in any distinguishing respect, its distinctly punitive function should be 
acknowledged and the appropriateness of discharge should be reviewable under the 
eighth amendment as well as under the equal protection clause and possibly under the 
attainder clauses of article I, sections 9 and 10. 
In a few cases, courts have set aside conditions on public jobs where they were 
ulterior to the function of the employment. See discussion and references in Bagley 
v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505-07, 421 P.2d 409, 414-15, 
55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-07 (1966). In a larger sense, this approach is best seen 
through the equal protection clause; even where the regulation may be said to serve 
legitimate state interests, where it is imposed only on public employees and the pur-
pose of the regulation does not coincide with a classification based on that employ-
ment relation, the regulation is arbitrarily underinclusive. 
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tion and qualification, the argument may claim too much in sug-
gesting that all conditions on public employment are constitutionally 
indistinguishable from identical regulations of equivalent private 
employment-that government derives no interests as employer 
which it lacks as regulator. 
The first qualification is merely one of explicit clarification. 
Tile comparison to be made in each case is not between the par-
ticular condition of public employment and a hypothetical reg-
ulation of private employment in general, but between the condition 
of public employment and the same regulation of equivalent jobs 
in the private sector. If the case at lland involves a first amendment 
claim that the government cannot discharge a ranking physicist 
in the Atomic Energy Commission in spite of his knowing member-
ship in the Communist Party, the comparision must fairly be made 
only with· a statute restricting private employment in truly "equiv-
alent" posts, i.e., those involving access to classified information, 
responsibilities closely connected with risks to national security, 
and authority possessed of considerable discretion. It would un-
fairly beg the question to compare the case at hand with one 
arising under a restriction against the private employment of Com-
munists in utterly nonsensitive and nondiscretionary jobs, or simply 
jobs in general; they are clearly not "equivalent," and their prob-
able immunity from political regulation provides no constructive 
analogy. 
The equivalency of the comparable private sector employment 
must first be established then, and this may not always be an easy 
task. In some instances, it is difficult to locate a private-sector 
equivalent of the public employment under review (as is nearly 
but not exactly true with an AEC physicist). In nearly every 
instance, moreover, there is a great amount of guesswork in de-
fining equivalency. Presumably, jobs are "equivalent" when they 
are functionally the same in terms of the discoverable valid purposes 
of the regulation in question-but courts (and counsel) must 
frequently guess at or simply invent a statement of purposes validly 
served by a given statute. Thus, we generously assumed that the 
purpose of the regulation applied to our AEC physicist was narrowly 
to safeguard national security rather than, say, simply to conserve 
job opportunities, discourage Communist Party affiliation, or some-
thing else. The problem of inferring legislative purpose is no greater 
here than elsewhere in the exercise of constitutional review, however, 
and the use of the analogical model can thus scarcely be faulted on 
this account alone. 
Even assuming that we can unerringly hypothesize "equiv-
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alent" public and private jobs with sufficient ease to make the 
model serviceable, we must also hypothesize the "same rule" as a 
regulation of those private jobs. But as we shall try to hypothesize 
the same rule, we shall also become aware of the fact that the private 
and public situations are distinguishable in still another important 
respect and that the distinction, once recognized, makes the private 
case far less easy to resolve than we had imagined. Yet, it was due 
to our faith that the private case is easier to resolve that we 
thought it useful to develop it analogically so that we might borrow 
the result and apply it to the actual case at hand. If the private 
case turns out not to be any easier to resolve, it becomes corre-
spondingly more doubtful whether the effort to make the analogy 
was worthwhile after all. 
For instance, let us suppose that we want to determine the 
constitutionality of a rule which authorizes but which does not 
require a public school board to dismiss any teacher who sports 
sideburns more than 1-1/2 inches below his ears or a hair style 
extending more than 1/2 inch down his collar.81 The equivalent 
job in the private sector is almost surely a teacher's job in a private 
school covering the same grade levels and, perhaps, involving the 
same cultural cross section of students. Would the "same" rule 
simply be a state statute which authorizes but which does not 
require a private school board to dismiss any teacher who sports 
sideburns more than 1-1/2 inches below his ears, etc.? The com-
parison becomes difficult to follow, for ordinarily a private school 
board's authority so to restrict the conditions of employment of 
its teachers would not require the existence of such a statute to 
begin with. The private school might have reserved the right to 
terminate a teacher for such cause without any such state statute, 
by contract. Further, such a statute does not necessarily forbid the 
private school to contract not to terminate its teachers for such 
cause. In short, the contract and the contractual will of the parties 
initially describe the private school relationship, and the hypoth-
esized state statute contributes very little. 
Would the analogy be clearer, however, if the public regulation 
81 See Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Finot v. Pasadena 
City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). Compare Ferrell 
v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 392 
F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). See also Breen v. Kahl, 296 
F. Supp. 703 ( 1969) (public school regulation of hair length held unconstitutional 
under due process clause of fourteenth amendment) ; Meyers v. Arcata Union High 
School District, 269 A.C.A. 633, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969) hair length school regulation 
held void for vagueness under fourteenth amendment); Leonard v. School Comm. of 
Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965). 
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provides that any public school teacher sporting the forbidden hair 
style shall be dismissed (rather than that he may be dismissed)? 
Shall we resolve the constitutionality of this rule by asking whether 
it would be constitutional for the state to require the dismissal of any 
similarly offending teacher in a private school, whether or not. the 
school proprietors as well as the private teachers object to the 
statute? Seemingly, this is the "same" rule, as far as the legitimacy 
of the state's interest is concerned. If that interest reflects a settled 
feeling that certain male hair styles set a "bad example" for the 
young, detract from a desirable educational atmosphere, induce a 
certain moral laxity or bohemian waywardness among students, and 
that these concerns override the marginal claim of the individual 
teacher's interests in personality, the situation is in these respects 
unchanged in the context of the private school. 
The cases are distinctly not the same in another critical respect, 
however, as Professor Linde acknowledged in an important foot-
note.32 Rather, the regulation as extended to the private sector 
trammels other important personal interests in addition to those 
of the employee, namely, interests (or prerogatives) of the private 
employer. Not only is the teacher forbidden to work without such a 
restriction, but the school proprietors are similarly restrained in 
their freedom to utilize their facilities in a manner which they 
regard as most appropriate. There is, in short, a "property right" 
interest of the private school which adds to the "civil liberties" 
claim of the private teacher, much as there was in Truax v. Raich,S3 
Myer v. Nebraska/4 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.35 The number 
and kinds of private prerogatives arranged against the regulation 
are doubled; it is the difference between a state law allowing an 
employer not to hire whom he pleases, on the one hand, and a law 
compelling him to dispense with the services of another, regardless 
of how he and the employee both feel, on the other hand. Where 
the state itself is the employer, of course, it cannot, by definition, 
have "private" interests different or apart from the policy the state 
has adopted for itself as employer. But such a situation is man-
ifestly not applicable to the private sector. 
To return for a moment to our earlier case, we were considering 
the statute which authorizes but does not require the firing of a 
public school teacher in terms of whether a statute permitting but 
not requiring the discharge of a private school teacher would be 
82 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WAsH. L. REV. at 43, n.304. 
88 239 u.s. 33 (1915). 
84 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
85 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
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valid. If the statute as applied to a private school is interpreted to 
permit such discharge even when the school has willingly contracted 
not to discharge the teacher on such grounds, it becomes clear that 
we have overextended the analogy once again. The private school 
proprietors may not want such a restriction; they may indeed feel 
that they can better compete for talented teachers by providing 
them with an enforceable assurance that they will not be fired for 
causes not immediately related to their job competence. The state 
statute not only restricts the private school teacher in this view, 
but it restricts the contractual and proprietary prerogatives of the 
private school board as well. Again, the interests arranged against 
the state statute are multiplied in a manner not subject to duplica-
tion when the only rule in question relates only to public rather 
than to private school boards. 
Nor is it entirely fair merely to say that the teacher's civil 
liberties claims have been conjoined with the proprietors' "mere 
property" claim, with both arranged against the policy of the state. 
Rather, the proprietors may hold a distinct educational philosophy 
which they wish to reflect in the kind of teachers they provide for 
their students. They, like the teachers, may believe that a more 
permissive and tolerant academic atmosphere is conducive to su-
perior education. There is little reason to denigrate the proprietors' 
interest as "merely" property, or othewise. to ignore it in the con-
stitutional balance. 
More importantly, however, it is only by ignoring this possible 
conjunction of employer-employee interests in the private sector that 
a great number of public employment regulations appear more 
clearly unconstitutional than otherwise, because facile use of the 
analogical model borrows from "same" cases where, in fact, the 
constitutional objections to the regulation as extended into the 
private sector are compounded. Professor Linde makes essentially 
the same observation in a footnote caveat where he wrote: 
To avoid misunderstanding: The present point is that, against an 
objection under the first, fourth, or fourteenth amendments, the valid-
ity of a governmental restraint in a publicly-owned place depends on 
whether government could, under the same conditions, and over the 
same objection, validly impose the same restraint in a similar pri-
vately-owned place. It leaves aside claims against land-use controls 
based on the private owner's property rights under the due process 
and just compensation clauses.36 
86 Linde, supra note 12, 40 WASH. L. REv. at 43, n.304. The distinction was 
acknowledged even as long ago as Mr. Justice Holmes' otherwise regrettable opinion 
in Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43 
(1897), where he acknowledged that the presence of "proprietary rights" (i.e., private 
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If one is obliged to disentangle the private property owner's own 
claims, or the private employer's own prerogatives, from those of 
the private employee in the analogical model, however, one may 
wonder whether the model does not lose most of its alleged value 
in clarifying the constitutionality vel non of a rule applicable only 
to public employees. The test which emerges is this: A condition 
imposed on public employment is not valid unless it would be valid 
if imposed as a regulation of private employees in equivalent jobs 
as against constitutional claims of such private employees alone 
(without consideration of whatever claims the private employer 
might also have and without knowing how the private employer 
feels about the situation). Thus qualified, the model achieves the 
necessary precision, but the task of separating employee from em-
ployer interests and setting aside the latter makes it terribly hard 
to use. 
Even with these qualifications, the model may still be far from 
perfect. In posing and testing various regulations in the public 
sector, we are almost inevitably drawn to illustrations where the 
employee's "constitutional right" to substantive due process is 
easily verbalized in terms of one or more of the guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights, especially the first amendment's explicit protection of 
free speech.37 This habit of mind tends to reduce the field of human 
interests where recognizable constitutional claims can arise and 
correspondingly turns us away from seeing defects in the analog-
ical model which would surely be noted if less familiar comparisons 
were made. We think almost reflexively or exclusively in terms of 
explicitly protected Bill of Rights interests, e.g., speech, religion, 
assembly, and press.38 More accurately, however, the concept of a 
broader substantive due process still lives, and under certain cir~ 
cumstances, almost any imaginable human interest may be pro-
tected from inhibitory legislation. One's interest in moving from 
ownership) would affect the constitutionality of a state law restricting places where 
speeches might be heard. 
37 Note that Professor Linde's qualifying quotation, see note 36 and accom-
panying text, supra, puzzlingly restricts the use of his test to objections raised "under 
the first, fourth, or fourteenth amendments." In context, it appears that he means to 
limit the utility of the test to explicitly named rights, e.g., speech and religion in the 
first amendment made applicable to the states via the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, although it is somewhat a mystery why other explicit rights (e.g., 
self-incrimination in the fifth amendment) are not mentioned and, of course, fourth 
amendment substantive rights, e.g., privacy as inferred by Justice Douglas in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), are not "explicitly" named in the fourth 
amendment at all. 
38 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938). 
But see Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571 
(1948); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation 
and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 34. · 
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place to place, for instance, has recently been subsumed as an 
interest sheltered by the (substantive) due process clause of the 
fifth amendment under some circumstances.39 One's interest in 
sexual intercourse within the marriage relation is subsumed in the 
(substantive) due process of the fourteenth amendment under some 
circumstances.40 Indeed, even interests in group association are not 
explicitly protected even in the first amendment itself. "Freedom 
of association" has been given separate constitutional status under 
the (substantive) due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 
for reasons fulfilling alleged functions of explicit first amendment 
interests, to be sure; but it receives protection as an independent 
interest and sometimes without particular reference to the political 
focus of speech and assembly.41 Mr. Justice Black to the contrary 
notwithstanding,42 Lochner v. New York48 is not dead in the sense 
that only "explicitly" named interests (i.e., those set out somewhere 
in the substantive portions of the Bill of Rights) find shelter in 
substantive due process.44 Even one's homely interest in the wear-
39 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Aptheker v. Secretary 
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). 
40 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), resting an alternative holding on substantive due process 
grounds, in keeping with (then) Justice Traynor's opinion in Perez v. Sharp, 32 
Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). 
41 See, e.g., Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Emerson, Freedom 
of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L,J. 1 (1964). 
42 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
515 (1969) (dissenting); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). From his opinion 
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), it would appear that Mr. Justice 
Douglas agrees that the character of interests protected by the fourteenth amendment 
is determined by reference to the more specific enumeration of protected interests in 
the Bill of Rights, but he finds a much larger array of such interests implied in the 
Bill of Rights than does Mr. Justice Black. 
43 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Note that without abandoning the principle that sub-
stantive due process brings "mere" economic interests within range of constitutional 
review, Lochner did not necessarily carry with it an unyielding absolutism in the 
measure of protection thus provided. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Muller 
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 n.11 (1967): "We recog-
nized in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 442, that 'the right to hold specific private 
employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental 
interference comes within the "liberty" and "property" concepts of the Fifth Amend-
ment.'" 
It does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that an interest is classified as 
one of substantive due process that the Lochner standards in reviewing the "reason-
ableness" of a state's interference with that ·interest are applicable. Arguably, this 
aspect of Lochner retains vitality only when the interest seeking protection can be 
verbaHzed as a "preferred" one within the Bill of Rights itself. See, e.g., Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). However, this restricted role of the Lochner stan-
dards in reviewing the reasonableness of state legislation does not explain the strict 
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ing of long hair may be constitutionally protected in the acid sense 
that a state law forbidding such a thing anywhere or anytime may, 
under some circumstances, at least, be so outrageous as to be in-
valid as applied-a petty denial of substantive due process. 
Of course, opinions will not be phrased in terms of a "consti-
tutional right to wear long hair," for that demeans a court and 
degrades the document. Rather, it will be described, perhaps, as 
an aspect of "personal integrity," or a right to be left alone, or 
even forced into the first amendment itself,45 just as, in Griswold, 
interests in sexual intercourse are given greater dignity as a "right 
of .marital privacy," and built up from penumbras of fourth amend-
ments, and just as interests in maximizing profits were once elevated 
as "freedom .of contract" or "rights of property." Correspondingly, 
of course, even the explicitly protected rights are protected only 
under some, not all, circumstances. 
All of this, however much it may seem otherwise, does ulti-
mately bear on the utility of the analogical model. For there are a 
great number of never-questioned conditions on public employment 
which might well raise substantial questions if recast as equivalent 
regulations of the private sector; and yet their possible dubiousness 
as state regulations in the private sector raises little serious question 
when the state is the employer precisely because the state, as em-
ployer, may involve some interests it lacks as general regulator. 
For instance, suppose the promulgation of a bureaucratic rule re-
quiring all attorneys in the United States Department of Justice 
to provide resumes of their work every twelve minutes on a daily 
basis, the rule being applicable to all attorneys in every division, 
indiscriminately and ultimately enforceable through an authority 
to discharge attorneys unwilling to comply.46 Granted the arguable 
unwisdom of the rule, should it also be conceded that it is consti-
tutionally challengeable unless an identical requirement imposed 
by the federal government on the private-sector counterparts of 
judicial scrutiny employed in the recent equal protection cases. See generally Karst, 
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-
Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969). In these cases, the interests 
involved are classified as "basic" or "fundamental" or "critical"-but it seems clear 
that this classification is not limited to interests considered to be protected by the Bill 
of Rights itself. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 68 (1968); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). It 
should also be observed that the Court may be indirectly returning to Lochner by its 
very expansive reading of the Bill of Rights so that nearly everything can be said, in 
one way or another, to be a "preferred" right. 
45 See note 31 supra. 
46 The hypothetical is, alas, not entirely fanciful. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1969, 
§ I, at 25, cols. 1-5. 
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these attorneys would clearly be valid? Is it possible that we might 
well conclude that "penumbras of privacy," self-employment pre-
rogatives, and even shades of first amendment protection (in an-
onymity) might insulate private practitioners from such officious 
time-and-motion census taking without, however, sufficing to over-
throw the scheme as restricited to government attorneys?47 Is it 
possible, in short, that government may be vouchsafed certain 
interests qua employer which it lacks qua regulator, and that we 
cannot therefore safely analogize the two roles for all purposes? 
For instance, suppose we test an unexceptional regulation which 
provides that a public school teacher reporting to work more than 
half an hour late on more than six occasions during an academic 
term without excuse for cause due to circumstances beyond his 
control shal.l be dismissed. Does the constitutionality of such a 
rule depend upon whether the state could similarly require the dis-
missal of any private school teacher identically late to work in his 
private school on more than six occasions? Suppose the rule is that 
public school teachers may have but one half-hour for lunch. Is it 
invalid unless a law forbidding private school teachers to contract 
for more than half an hour at lunch break is also constitutional? 
No important public policy can honestly be said to be accomplished 
by such a statute, and reasonable persons may be of different 
opinions as to the desirable length of a lunchtime. The regulation 
as a rigid constraint on private teachers (quite apart from the 
interference with the private employers' interests) seems quite 
arbitrary, displacing their wishes and serving no particular public 
purpose. The needs of the schools and of the teachers alike are 
surely better met by allowing greater flexibility to exist. At the 
same time, a half-hour for lunch may not be too short to nourish a 
teacher; the public school authority may find some advantage in 
it; there is, after all, need for a line to be drawn somewhere for 
ease of administration; the teacher cannot show in what respect 
the rule seriously disadvantages him; and we are less likely to 
quarrel with it as a rule within the discretion of state authorities 
to adopt as a standard rule merely for the public schools. More 
importantly, the state as employer or school proprietor does have 
some choices which it cannot avoid making qua employer or qua 
proprietor which it distinctly can and should avoid as regulator of 
the private sector. To say that it cannot make any choice unless it 
could also impose that choice on the private sector seems absurd. 
47 See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1968). Compare Garrity v. 
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 593 (1967), with Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). See 
also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
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The two roles of government are not entirely fungible, and the 
analogical model simply fails. To imply that with a dozen reason-
ably similar arithmetic books from which to choose, for instance, 
the state may not choose any one for required and uniform use in 
public schools unless it could insist that all private school teachers 
must use that one, too, implies too much. There are needs of 
economy of purchase, ease of administration and standardization 
which may sustain the choice in the public sector, not sufficient in 
themselves to oust the prerogatives of others to use different, albeit 
equally competent books in private schools. Indeed, it may well be 
that the protected pluralism of the private sector is all that makes 
the uniformity of the public sector tolerable. 
A parting observation may be made about the use of the 
analogical model in association with one of Mr. Justice Douglas' 
views of state action. In some fairly celebrated places, Mr. Justice 
Douglas has implied that what is done in the private sector with 
the mere permission or license of the state (and not merely by its 
command or order) is done as though required by the state itself.48 
By such reasoning, the merely licensed act of a private party is 
reviewable against fourteenth amendment standards of due process 
(substantive and procedural) and equal protection. Coupling this 
view with the analogical model produces a dizzying circle of con-
stitutional analysis that becomes impossibly difficult to penetrate, 
however, and it tends to yield results quite opposed to what the 
model was practically meant to do. For, working backwards, it 
appears to imply that whatever a state can constitutionally permit 
to exist in the private sector, it may also adopt as a requirement in 
the public sector without the standard becoming any less constitu-
tional. If, then, a licensed drug store is constitutionally free to 
hire only druggists who are Democrats, the state may itself like-
wise hire only democratic druggists. If a licensed private school 
could forbid its teachers to wear beards, then so may the state 
forbid its teachers to wear beards.49 In short, the development of a 
48 Se.e, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242, 255-60 (1964) (concurring 
opinion); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274, 276-83 (1963) (concurring 
opinion); Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176, 182-85 (1961) (concurring 
opinion); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 300 (1956) (dissenting opinion). 
In fact, however, Justice Douglas' views on the application of the fourteenth amend- . 
ment to the private sector is much more complicated and sensitive than this, taking 
into account such additional considerations as the character of the interests involved, 
the kind and degree of governmental enforcement, and the scope of impact of decisions 
made in the private sector. 
49 But see Mr. Justice Douglas' vigorous dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari 
in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968), in which he makes 
a telling argument respecting the relevance of the equal protection clause to a public 
school restriction on student hair length. Indeed, it should certainly be acknowledged 
772 UCLA LAW REVIEW 
theory originally designed to spread the coverage of the Bill of 
Rights into influential parts of the private sector may, woodenly 
applied, have the opposite effect of contracting coverage in the 
public sector. Faced with the choice of either stratifying the pre-
rogatives of private employers exactly to conform with constitu-
tional norms in the public sector, or removing constitutional norms 
from the public sector to correspond with pluralistic practices 
extant in the private sector, a court is surely as likely to opt for 
the second alternative as for the first. The case remains to be made, 
however, that these are the only alternatives. We may need to bear 
in mind that analogies are only analogies and, by definition, not 
the "same." 
IV. 
The inflexible use of particular analogies, including the one 
we have examined, has not in fact characterized Mr. Justice Doug-
las' contributions to the Court. 5° Rather, his opinions fully reflect 
the impression one gets simply from watching him within the Su-
preme Court itself. Incredibly restless on the bench, he conveys a 
sense of impatience to reach central issues and an almost physical 
brusqueness with procedural needlepoint. His manner implies that 
counsel had best be right about the critical core of his case-that 
appeals to judicial modesty, parades of horribles, administrative 
ease and convenience, etc., are unworthy trade-offs for essential 
principles of constitutional liberty. 
Correspondingly, the Douglas opinions more than occasionally 
are brusque and restless, too. They give fits to readers and offer 
fair game to critics because they are seen as untidy and almost care-
less in their flow. They sometimes range far beyond the necessities 
of the case, leaving broad pronouncements unelaborated (e.g., "No-
tions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the 
Equal Protection Clause do change ... "),51 upsetting entire schools 
of constitutional theory and distressing confidence in continuity. 
Yet, without raking through thirty years of his work to make 
the point again, I think it very clear that he has helped immeasur-
ably to end the constitutional orphanage of public employees and 
that we have gained, not lost, in loyalty and efficiency at the same 
time. There is, moreover, an obvious explanation of his great and 
steadfast contributions: Mr. Justice Douglas has a very rugged 
Constitution. 
that this brief article has concerned itself more with Professor Linde's analogical 
model than with an attempt to capture even a significant part of Mr. Justice Douglas' 
calculus of constitutional review. 
50 See note 11 supra. 
51 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 v.s. 663, 669 (1966). 
